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reassemble all the pieces that had been removed into a second
ship, which would be the ship of Theseus? The results of experi-
mental studies with children and adults confirm that most individ-
uals infer that individuals that are gradually replaced by
component parts retain their identity (Hall 1998). This is
because we infer an essential element in addition to the material
composition when we are asked to consider the unique nature of
things. Hall’s (1998) developmental study revealed a stronger es-
sentialist perspective for living things compared to an artefact, but
we will essentialize objects that we consider significant by virtue of
their unique identity if they have sentimental value (Hood &
Bloom 2008). I have conjectured that this holds especially true
for emotional objects such as memorabilia associated with individ-
uals that we revere, from celebrities to religious saints, as well as
so-called murderbilia, which are the items associated with mur-
derers (Hood 2009). The authenticity of an object is similarly con-
ferred by essentialist beliefs so much so that the value we place on
objects such as artworks or collectibles is shaped by what we
believe the object to be (Bloom 2010). For many, a perfect
forgery indistinguishable from an original lacks some property
that is difficult to articulate, consistent with the placeholder func-
tion that essentialism provides (Medin & Ortony 1989).
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Abstract: There are two problems with Cimpian & Salomon’s (C&S’s)
claim that an innate inherence heuristic is part of our cognitive makeup.
First, some of their examples of inherent features do not seem to accord
with the authors’ own definition of inherence. Second, rather than posit
an inherence heuristic to explain why humans rely more heavily on
inherent features, it may be more parsimonious to do so on the basis of
aspects of the world itself and our relationship to it.
Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) present some intriguing preliminary
evidence for the existence of an inherence heuristic, a basic cog-
nitive tendency that leads people to explain patterns with refer-
ence to inherent features rather than extrinsic (i.e., relational or
historical) features. While we find it plausible that people rely
more heavily on inherent rather than relational properties in rea-
soning about many domains, we have doubts about the possibility
of drawing the distinction between inherent and extrinsic proper-
ties unambiguously enough to enable us to conclude with confi-
dence that participants are clearly tracking such a distinction in
all the examples cited. But even if we set aside these doubts,
the tendency that C&S are describing may not represent a cogni-
tive bias of its own, but may instead emerge from the way the
world is and our perceptual access to it.
C&S’s account “classifies features as inherent if they can be said
to characterize how an entity is constituted” (sect. 2.2.1, para. 1),
and they add that these features tend to be stable and enduring.
We take the distinction that they are tracking to be roughly that
between intrinsic and extrinsic features – features that an individ-
ual object or entity has on its own and would continue to have in
the absence of everything else, as opposed to those that an individ-
ual has in virtue of its relations to others. Paradigmatic cases of the
former are perceptual features of an object, such as its size, mass,
shape, or color. Clear examples of the latter are features that
pertain to an object’s location, position, relationships, or history,
such as the fact that it is lying on top of the bookshelf, is located
in Toronto, is my favorite toy, was manufactured in 2010, or
belongs to the public library. But though there seem to be
many clear-cut cases, there are other features that may be trickier
to classify in one or the other category.1 This creates a few prob-
lems in the evidence that the authors rely upon, since a number of
cases that they cite as instances of inherent features would seem in
fact to be relational, extrinsic, or historical by C&S’s own defini-
tion. For example, that orange juice has a tangy taste and that it
is healthy, are both facts that pertain to the relation of orange
juice to humans (or to some humans, since it may be unhealthy
or taste differently to others). Thus, these features are arguably
not inherent. Similarly, if Amy laughs at Beth’s joke because
Beth is funny, that fact is extrinsic to the joke (though it is an inher-
ent feature of Beth). Meanwhile, in discussing extrinsic features of
objects (such as historical features), C&S give the example of a
router that stops working when accidentally stepped on.
However, this episode in the history of the router presumably
alters the inherent properties of the router, which is what prevents
it from functioning. So it would be correct for a participant to say
that the router stopped functioning due to an inherent defect,
though that defect was caused by an event in its causal history.
The fact that some examples the authors cite of inherent features
can be considered relational according to their own criterion, and
vice versa, implies that it is hard to be sure what kinds of features
participants are using in some of the experiments that are meant
to support the authors’ hypothesis. But if we set this worry aside
and focus on those cases about which theremay be little uncertain-
ty, another concern emerges: If inherent features are roughly those
that pertain to the individual or object taken in isolation, as opposed
to ones pertaining to its relations, origin, history, and so on, then the
former are the ones that tend to be perceptually salient to human
beings and easily ascertainable. So it may not be a basic cognitive
feature of humans, but rather a function of our relation to the
world, that makes “inherent” features salient. Also, more often
than not and in many domains, these features tend to be more ex-
planatory than relational features. When it comes to the domain of
physical objects, their motion, constancy, solidity, and so on (a
domain that develops early in ontogeny), an object’s length,
width, shape, mass, density, material composition, texture, and
other inherent features tend to be more explanatory of its patterns
of behavior than its geographic location, ownership, and date of
manufacture. This also holds to a large extent of the domain of
living creatures. To be sure, when it comes to the domain of arti-
facts, extrinsic function tends to be more important than inherent
features, and a chair can be made of a wide range of materials, can
have various dimensions, material compositions, colors, and so on,
yet remain a chair. But here, too, inherent features and function
cannot drift too far apart. (How many chairs are made out of
paper or are the size of a house?) Thus, given what is perceptually
salient to human observers and given some broad features of the
material world, it stands to reason that inherent features will be
accessed more readily by cognizers and will have more explanatory
power. If so, then there may be no need to posit a separate inher-
ence heuristic to understand why cognitive agents reach first for
inherent rather than extrinsic features to explain patterns in the
world around them.
Finally, we cannot help entertaining the possibility that C&S
fall prey to the inherence heuristic in positing an innate heuristic
to explain certain human cognitive tendencies, rather than ex-
plaining them in terms of relations of human beings to the
world. But then, wouldn’t that be a dramatic confirmation of
the very heuristic that the authors claim to observe? Not necessar-
ily: We are arguing that, instead of a basic component of our
innate cognitive endowment, our tendency to explain patterns
on the basis of inherent features is instead a function of our rela-
tionship to the world and of features of the world itself.
NOTE
1. There is a debate in metaphysics on the proper characterization of
the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction (e.g., see Langton & Lewis 1998;
Lewis 1983; Vallentyne 1997). But that is not our concern here; rather,
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we are concerned with whether people draw this distinction consistently
enough to serve as the basis for a cognitive heuristic.
Is it about “pink” or about “girls”? The
inherence heuristic across social and
nonsocial domains
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Abstract: The inherence heuristic provides an intriguing and novel
explanation for early thought in a variety of domains. Exploring
similarities and differences in inherent reasoning across social and
nonsocial domains can help us understand the role that inherent
thinking plays in the development of human reasoning and the process
by which more elaborate essentialist reasoning develops.
Our drive to understand observed patterns in the world is perva-
sive and supports powerful learning throughout life. The inher-
ence heuristic provides groundwork for this understanding both
within everyday reasoning and across development, and has the
potential to explain a wide range of psychological phenomena.
We applaud the authors’ thoughtful proposal. Yet, further specifi-
cation of key aspects of the proposal – particularly regarding the
domain specificity or the generality of inherence thinking –will
clarify further the theoretical underpinnings of the heuristic and
generate related research.
Are inherence beliefs about entities in the world (e.g., “pink as
feminine”) at all different from inherence beliefs about people or
their psychological states (e.g., “girls like feminine things”)?
Cimpian & Salomon (C&S) state that both might be the case
and may depend on the particular context at hand. We agree
that understanding which patterns are subjected to the heuristic
process is complex, yet we suggest that there may be important
differences in the ways that people attend to, encode, and
explain observed patterns in different domains. Are different
kinds of evidence similarly susceptible to inherence reasoning?
For instance, is it easier or harder to learn a new conceptualization
of “pink” or of “girls,” and are beliefs about people and non-
person entities similarly resistant to change in the face of counter-
evidence? One possibility is that information about people may be
particularly easily viewed as inherent, and thus it may be relatively
easier to update a belief about the femininity of “pink” as com-
pared to the femininity of “girls.” Understanding how inherent
reasoning is implemented across domains can be informative for
understanding the development of children’s reasoning about
diverse concepts (e.g., people, animates, artifacts) and could also
be informative about the functioning of the inherence heuristic
more generally.
Relatedly, an inquiry into the domain specificity or generality of
inherence thinking across social and nonsocial domains could shed
light on the relationship between early inherence beliefs and later
essentialist beliefs. Although intriguing, the proposal for the
nature of the developmental change of essentialist reasoning as
stemming from the inherence heuristic could be further specified.
Is the change proposed to involve conceptual content that grows
richer or conceptual content that is continuous over time yet
whose exhibition requires the emergence of other supporting ma-
chinery? Social and nonsocial domains have the potential to differ
not only in the way that observed patterns are weighed against ex-
isting inherent intuitions, but also in the way that inherence expla-
nations are incorporated into essentialist explanations across
development. C&S propose that inherent reasoning may indeed
be overridden by counterevidence. They discuss the example of
artifact categories: Children initially believe that artifact
categories derive from inherent features, but they may abandon
that belief in the face of evidence that objects are constructed
by people for particular functions. This example raises the
general question of what guides children toward or away from in-
herent or essentialist beliefs across development, and whether at-
tention to the evidence presented, the weighing process of
evidence against intuitions, or both, might differ across
domains. Selectivity in the patterns that are noticed and explained
could play a crucial role in the workings of the inherence heuristic
in and of itself and in the elaboration of some, but not all, inherent
thinking into essentialist thinking.
We also question how critical to the theory is it that inherence
reasoning applies more for patterns of behavior than for specific
instances (or for information about groups of people rather than
specific individuals). In theory, couldn’t the inherence heuristic
apply for both kinds of information? For example, if a child
learned that someone is good at gorp, why not draw the inference
that there is something intrinsic about him that allows him to
gorp? Imagine an alternative pattern of results: Suppose children
presented with both category-wide and individual-specific
information endorsed inherent explanations – this hypothetical
pattern of results could presumably also be interpreted as sup-
porting the inherence heuristic. Yet, given the reported evidence
that information about groups of people is more compelling than
information about specific individuals, this finding may provide an
opportunity to explore the relationship between inherence think-
ing and social categorization. It is plausible that persistent and co-
herent conceptual differences in reasoning across domains could
result in differential explanations of patterns observed across
people and patterns observed across objects.
Finally, the diversity of children’s early environments and
social experiences may have important influences on the devel-
opment of the inherence heuristic across domains. The authors
note that context and culture could guide the types of candidate
explanations that become accessible to the heuristic. There are at
least two ways in which early experience could guide inherent
reasoning: through the available evidence and patterns to be ex-
plained that may differ across cultures, and through more perva-
sive individual differences that may vary across cultural contexts
and could in turn influence the workings of the heuristics. To
give one example, evidence suggests that bilingual children are
more likely to see word-to-referent pairings as arbitrary (Bialy-
stok 1988). Given the proposed link between beliefs about
nominal realism and inherence, might children raised in
diverse linguistic environments also be less susceptible to the in-
herence heuristic? It seems possible that both the process of
learning two languages, as well as the diverse social experiences
that accompany bilingualism or biculturalism, may influence
children’s inherent thinking. If so, the influence of such cultural
diversity might be explored for both social and nonsocial
domains of reasoning.
Does the inherence heuristic take us to
psychological essentialism?
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Abstract: We argue that the claim that essence-based causal explanations
emerge, hydra-like, from an inherence heuristic is incomplete.
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